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This paper examines downward nominal wage rigidity in Japan at the 
individual level using Japanese longitudinal data. By observing the nominal
wage change distributions and applying several statistical tests for asymmetry
to them, we obtain the following findings. First, using 1993–98 data, the
nominal wage change distributions are statistically skewed to the right with
large spikes near the zero points, which indicates that downward nominal
wage rigidity does exist in Japan. Second, the extent of the downward 
nominal wage rigidity is sensitive to the choice of nominal wage measures.
While the extent of the downward rigidity for the hourly wages of part-time
female employees is substantial, those for the regular monthly salaries 
and annual earnings of full-time male and female employees are limited in
the sense that approximately one-fourth of the full-time employee samples
experience nominal cuts. Third, for the regular monthly salaries of male
employees only, the observed right-skewness of the nominal wage distributions
tends to decrease as the inflation rate rises, although the analysis is limited 
to a period with an extremely low inflation rate.
Keywords:  Downward nominal wage rigidity; Inflation rate; Monetary
policy; Longitudinal data; Nominal wage change distributions
JEL Classification: C15, C24, E50, J30I. Introduction
Following the collapse of the bubble economy at the beginning of the 1990s, Japan
has experienced low inflation and mild deflation. The inflation rate, as measured by
the consumer price index (CPI), dropped below zero in 2000. Since then, prices have
continued to decline at a rate on the order of 1 percent per year. Meanwhile, the
Japanese unemployment rate has risen to an unprecedented level. 
It was often said in the 1970s and 1980s that the Japanese unemployment rate
during recessions is relatively low since Japanese real wages are effectively adjusted via
labor-management cooperation. However, many now suggest that such a flexible
adjustment was only possible under relatively high inflation, because firms could 
easily cut real wages by just keeping the nominal wage change rate below the inflation
rate. Of course, even under extremely low inflation or deflation, real wages can be
adjusted by simply cutting nominal wages. But if firms are unable to cut nominal
wages due to downward nominal wage rigidity, they may resort to dismissal to adjust
their personnel costs. In this case, the unemployment rate rises as the inflation rate
decreases. This kind of argument can often be seen in the statements attributing
recent increases in the unemployment rate to the difficulties of implementing 
nominal wage cuts under low inflation or deflation.
1,2
To consider the validity of this argument, this paper empirically examines 
whether or not downward nominal wage rigidity exists in Japan. To the best of our
knowledge, the only prior research on downward nominal wage rigidity in Japan is
Kimura and Ueda (2001). Using 1978–98 aggregate time-series data and the 
nominal wages of 18 industries from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare), they conclude that downward nominal wage rigidity
exists in Japan. However, when they extend the data to the first quarter of 2000 
by using different aggregate time-series from the Monthly Labour Survey (Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare), they obtain the opposite result that there is no
downward nominal wage rigidity.
3
Analyses using aggregate time-series, however, might not be suitable for examin-
ing downward nominal wage rigidity, because the observed nominal wage flexibility
at the aggregated level might reflect quantitative adjustments within firms. Such
quantitative adjustments include reducing working hours and substituting low-wage
for high-wage employees. For instance, even if nominal wage decreases are observed
at the aggregated level, this observation is consistent with quantitative adjustments
whereby costly full-time employees are replaced by cheaper part-time employees
under constant nominal full-time and part-time wages.
4 In other words, nominal
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1. The advocates of this argument further insist that the Bank of Japan should target a small but positive rather than
zero inflation rate to facilitate real wage adjustments.
2. This argument for fostering inflation under certain circumstances is also found in earlier literature such as Pigou
(1933), Keynes (1936), and Tobin (1972).
3. Kimura and Ueda (2001) argue that if there is no downward nominal wage rigidity, nominal wage changes have a
linear relation with real GDP and indices of labor market tightness. Based on this assumption, they find a non-
linear relation when using data from 1978 to 1998. However, when they extend the data until the first quarter of
2000, they obtain a linear relation. Kimura and Ueda state numerous possible interpretations for their results, but
do not reach any definitive conclusions.
4. In Japan, it is often said that the labor market is segmented between full-time employees with relatively high wages
and part-time employees with relatively low wages (i.e., that Japan has “dual labor markets”). Many studies suggestwage decreases at the aggregated level do not necessarily mean that there is no 
downward nominal wage rigidity at the individual level.
To address such aggregation bias in nominal wage changes, this paper uses
Japanese longitudinal data and examines nominal wage changes at the individual
level. Since this paper is the first attempt to use Japanese longitudinal data to 
examine this issue, it is useful to review the prior research that investigates downward
nominal wage rigidity using longitudinal data in other economies. 
Many of the research papers examine the shape of nominal wage change distribu-
tions, and conclude that nominal wages are downwardly rigid since there are a 
considerably large number of samples with zero nominal wage changes, as well as
more samples with positive nominal wage changes than with negative ones.
For example, McLaughlin (1994, 1999, 2000), one of the pioneering empirical
analyses, examines the shape of the nominal wage change distribution by using the
U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). He shows that there are a large number
of samples with zero nominal wage changes and that the shape of the distribution
appears to be skewed away from nominal wage cuts. Lebow et al. (1995) argue that the
nominal wage change distribution is statistically skewed to the right based on their
own measure of the skewness of the nominal wage change distribution. Card and
Hyslop (1997) nonparametrically calculate the counterfactual distribution of real 
wage changes in the absence of wage rigidities. They then use the counterfactual 
distributions to measure the fraction of negative real wage changes “prevented” by
nominal wage rigidities. Kahn (1997) estimates the heights of histogram bars through
regression to examine whether the height becomes significantly lower in cases where
the nominal wage change rate is negative with a given distance from the median. 
It is important to note, however, that most of the prior research was implemented
in environments with relatively high inflation rates. Under such an environment,
nominal wages on average must grow at a relatively high positive rate as well. Thus, it
may not be possible to identify downward nominal wage rigidity using data during
periods of relatively high inflation since it may not be binding.
The longitudinal data used in this paper range from 1993 through 1998. As
shown in Figure 1, Japan’s inflation rate during this period held at a low level of –0.1
to 1.24 percent in the CPI.
5 This recent Japanese experience provides a unique
chance to consistently identify downward nominal wage rigidity, if it exists.
6
The main findings we obtain in this paper are as follows. First, the nominal wage
change distributions during 1993–98 have large spikes near the zero points, and are
skewed to the right, indicating infrequent nominal wage cuts. The right-skewness is
also confirmed through several statistical tests for asymmetry. Thus, judging from the
shape of the nominal wage change distributions, downward nominal wage rigidity
does exist in Japan. Second, the extent of the downward nominal wage rigidity is 
3
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that Japanese institutional systems, particularly the tax and social security system, prevent part-time employees’
wages from rising relative to those of full-time employees. Fujiki et al. (2001) show that the average hourly wage of
part-time employees is about 70 percent of that of full-time employees. 
5. The GDP deflator was at –1.34 to 0.787 percent during the same period. These figures are not adjusted for the 
2 percentage point rise in the consumption tax from April 1997.
6. One may infer the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity from Figure 1, which shows higher growth rates
for nominal wages than for prices.sensitive to the choice of nominal wage measures. The hourly wages of part-time
female employees exhibit fairly strong downward rigidity, while the downward 
nominal wage rigidities for the regular monthly salaries and annual earnings of full-
time male and female employees are limited. It is worth noting that nearly one-fourth
of the samples of full-time male and female employees experience nominal cuts in their
regular monthly salaries and annual earnings. Third, for the regular monthly salaries of
male employees only, the observed right-skewness of the nominal wage distributions
tends to decrease as the inflation rate rises although the analysis is limited to a period
with an extremely low inflation rate. This may provide one piece of evidence to 
support monetary policy targeting a small but positive inflation rate rather than a zero
inflation to “grease the wheels” of the labor market.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II describes the longitudinal data
used for the analyses herein. After explaining our definition of downward nominal
wage rigidity, Section III shows the nominal wage change distribution for the regular
monthly salaries of full-time employees. Section IV examines downward nominal
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Notes: 1. The total cash earnings and scheduled cash earnings are the percentage changes from
the previous year. The inflation rate is the percentage change from the previous year in
the overall CPI (adjusted for the April 1997 consumption tax increase).
Notes: 2. The total cash earnings and scheduled cash earnings are per capita for workplaces with
at least 30 employees.
Sources: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Monthly Labour Survey; Ministry of Public
Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Consumer Price Index,
Labour Force Survey.wage rigidity for other types of wages, such as annual earnings and hourly wages by
employment status and sex. Section IV also considers the differences in individual
characteristics and the relationship between nominal wage rigidity and wage differen-
tials. Section V discusses the distinction between downward nominal wage rigidity
and downward real wage rigidity, and then examines the correlation between down-
ward nominal wage rigidity and the inflation rate. Finally, Section VI presents the
concluding remarks of this paper based on the results obtained in Sections III–V.
II. Data 
We use the data from the 1993–98 waves of the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers
(JPSC). The JPSC, which has been conducted by the Institute for Research on
Household Economics (IRHE) since 1993, is the only Japanese longitudinal data at
the individual level, and is available to researchers upon application to the IRHE.
The survey population comprises Japanese females residing nationwide who were in
the 24–34 age group in 1993. The samples were selected at random using a two-stage
sampling process. While males are excluded from the survey population, the survey
does include information on the husbands of those females in the sample who are
married. Thus, the survey provides nearly equivalent information on males and
females. The JPSC covers a wide array of information including employment status,
income, expenses, assets, and liabilities.
7
We use the samples who worked at the same firm for two consecutive years.
8
Those who are self-employed, working in family businesses, switching jobs, or 
unemployed are excluded. Since the 1993 data on males are not available, the 
analyses for male employees are limited to the period from 1994–98. 
It is important to note the following caveats when using the JPSC data for our analy-
sis. First, these data are surveyed from very limited age groups. Specifically, the female
respondents were in the 24–34 age group in 1993 and 29–39 age group in 1998.
9
Second, the male data are limited to the spouses of the female respondents, and are
5
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7. According to the IRHE (1995), the JPSC samples have the following properties. First, they basically reflect the
population of Japanese females in the 24–34 age group. Second, the characteristics of the JPSC samples essentially
match those compiled in other statistical surveys. Those surveys include the Population Census and the Family
Income and Expenditure Survey (both from the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and
Telecommunications), and the Employment Status Survey (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare). Third, the
major differences from the other survey samples are as follows: (1) the number of females living in single-member
households is small; (2) a somewhat large number of couples are living together with their parents; (3) the number
of couples with no children is somewhat small; (4) the average educational level is slightly higher; and (5) the 
average household income is slightly lower.
8. To be specific, the samples are those who responded “yes” to the question “Were you working at the same 
company where you are presently employed, one year ago?”
9. Females with these characteristics account for about 30 percent of the entire population of Japanese female
employees. More specifically, according to the Labour Force Survey (Ministry of Public Management, Home
Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications), there were 7.2 million female employees between the ages of 25 and 34
on average in 1993, equivalent to 34.8 percent of the total population of 20.7 million female employees.
Furthermore, by restricting the samples to those who had been employed at the same company for two consecu-
tive years, the samples used in this paper comprise about 29.8 percent of the total number of female employees
(according to the Survey on Economic Trends [Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare], on average 14.4 percent
of regular employees left their jobs within less than one year in 1993).therefore not selected using statistical sampling methods.
10 In addition, the sample 
does not include single men. Third, the only available data are those from 1993 
to 1998. Since the inflation and nominal wage increase rates were extremely low or 
even negative throughout this period, this is an appropriate period for examining 
downward nominal wage rigidity. However, it does not allow us to further investigate
the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity under the continued deflation 
period since 1999. Moreover, the empirical evidence obtained from this data set 
is not directly applicable to evaluate the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity 
during the 1980s, when the inflation and nominal wage increase rates were both 
relatively high in Japan.
11
III. Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity of Regular Monthly 
Salaries: Skewness of the Nominal Wage Change Distribution
A. Definition of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
Here we define downward nominal wage rigidity in relation to the shape of the 
nominal wage change distribution in longitudinal data.
First, nominal wages are defined as “flexible” whenever the shape of the nominal
wage change distribution approaches that of a normal distribution. This is because if
nominal wages are completely flexible, some individuals’ nominal wages should
decline while those of others rise, in accordance with individuals’ skills and labor
market conditions. 
Second, we define nominal wages as “rigid” whenever a spike near the zero point
is observed in the nominal wage change distribution, that is, whenever the nominal
wages of a very large number of the individuals are virtually unchanged.
Third, we define nominal wages as “downwardly rigid” when they are “rigid” and
the nominal wage change distribution has an asymmetric shape whereby the right-
hand side of the spike near the zero point is bigger than the left-hand side. This
comes from the idea that nominal wage increases must be more frequently observed
than decreases when there is downward rigidity in nominal wages.
12 Nevertheless, our
definition of downward rigidity in nominal wages does not exclude the possibility
that the nominal wages of certain employees may decrease.
When downward nominal wage rigidity is defined in this manner, the degree of
the downward nominal wage rigidity can be measured based on the percentage of the
samples with negative nominal wage changes. For example, when the spike near the
zero point is conspicuously large and almost no samples show negative wage changes,
the degree of the downward nominal wage rigidity is judged as substantially large.
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10. The ages of the males in our sample vary between 23 and 54. Approximately 10 percent of these males were in
their 20s, 65 percent in their 30s, and 23 percent in their 40s, and the sample includes very few males 50 or
older. Therefore, it is important to note that the age band in our sample is rather narrow for both sexes.
11. An additional limitation is the difficulty in distinguishing between downward nominal and real wage rigidity, as
explained below, because the data do not cover any periods with high inflation.
12. Many prior research papers also interpret nominal wages as downwardly rigid if the observed nominal wage 
distribution shows these properties.B. Changes in Regular Monthly Salaries
We calculate the changes in regular monthly salaries as follows. First, we extract the
monthly salaries of full-time employees from each wave of the JPSC.
13 Next, since the
monthly salary in the JPSC includes overtime pay, we adopt only those samples
whose overtime working hours did not change significantly from the previous year.
Removing the samples whose overtime working hours changed eliminates the effects
of changes in overtime working hours on reported regular monthly salaries.
14,15 As a
result of this data selection, 1,292 samples are available for the following analyses on
the regular monthly salaries of full-time employees.
16
Figure 2 [1] presents the nominal wage change distribution (histogram) of the
regular monthly salaries of full-time employees. The bell-shaped line on the 
histogram shows the normal distribution calculated from the mean and the standard
deviation of the data. The small triangle (∆) located on the horizontal axis slightly
above the zero point indicates the median. 
Looking at this figure, we see that (1) its shape is clearly different from the normal
distribution whose mean and standard deviation are equal to those of the empirical
nominal wage change distribution; (2) more than 20 percent of the samples have 
a nominal wage change rate around zero, forming a high spike around the zero 
point; and (3) the distribution looks skewed to the right, as the number of samples to
the right of the spike is greater than the number to the left. Thus, based on our 
definitions, we may conclude that the nominal wages measured by the regular
monthly salaries of full-time employees are downwardly rigid. 
Figure 2 [2] presents the symmetrically differenced histogram. The symmetrically
differenced histogram, which is proposed by McLaughlin (1999), is computed by 
taking equal-sized intervals around the median and subtracting those on the left-hand
side from those on the right. If there is no nominal wage rigidity and the median and
7
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13. The monthly salaries are expressed in units of ¥1,000. We assume that the possible effects of rounding errors in
reported nominal wages are negligible.
14. We use those samples who gave the same responses in consecutive years to the question asking how many 
overtime working hours per week were included in their monthly salaries (0, 1–3, 4–5, 6–10, 11–15, 16–20, 
or 21 or more). To eliminate the influence from assignments to differing tasks during the survey period, we 
also limit the samples to those who responded that they had not been transferred and that their working duties
had remained unchanged from the prior year (we adopt this same restriction for the hourly wages of part-time
female employees in Section V). It is important to note that the samples, extracted in this fashion, may include 
a disproportionately large percentage of employees engaged in routine work. In addition, it is important to 
consider that many Japanese employees may be engaged in unpaid overtime work, and this may affect the 
accuracy of the analyses. For example, even when an employee’s nominal wage remains unchanged, if the number
of unpaid overtime working hours increases, the employee’s actually-worked-base hourly wage may be considered
to have decreased. Although the JPSC provides multiple-choice information regarding the number of unpaid
overtime working hours (0, 1–3, 4–5, 6–10, 11–15, 16–20, or 21 or more), it is impossible to accurately 
calculate the number of unpaid overtime working hours. We therefore ignore the unpaid overtime.
15. Since detailed data on working hours are not available, we do not convert the monthly salaries and annual 
earnings to an hourly wage basis. Some of the prior research (e.g., McLaughlin [1999]) intentionally does not
convert salaries into hourly wage rates because of the high possibility of measurement errors in reported working
hours. Also, in Japan, because of the amendment of the Labour Standards Act, the number of scheduled working
hours was rapidly reduced from the late 1980s through the early 1990s. According to the Basic Survey on Wage
Structure (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare), however, the number of regular hours actually worked by
full-time workers had stopped declining by 1993. Therefore, we assume that reductions in scheduled working
hours have no significant impact on the analyses herein.
16. Approximately 2,200 to 2,500 males and females are available from each wave, but the number of samples
adopted here is narrowed down, as described above. To eliminate the influence from obvious measurement
errors, samples whose wage change rates have absolute values of over 100 percent are also excluded.8 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/AUGUST 2003
Figure 2  Nominal Wage Change Distribution: 
Histogram and Symmetrically Differenced Histogram










Note: The bell-shaped line on the histogram shows the normal 
distribution calculated from the mean and standard deviation 
of the data. The small triangle (∆) located on the horizontal 
axis slightly above the zero point indicates the median.







[2] Symmetrically Differenced Histogram
mean values of the nominal wage changes are equal, the values of the symmetrically 
differenced histogram should be zero at all points. Alternatively, if there is downward
nominal wage rigidity, most of the values of the symmetrically differenced histogram
should be positive, since they reflect the right-skewness of the distribution.Looking at the symmetrically differenced histogram in Figure 2, we see that the
majority of the values are positive, which means the nominal wage change distribu-
tion is skewed to the right.
17 This reconfirms our conclusion that downward nominal
wage rigidity does exist for the regular monthly salaries of full-time employees.
The histograms in Figure 3 present the distributions of the changes in regular
monthly wages year by year. Each of these histograms seems to be right-skewed with a
large spike near zero. Furthermore, comparing the heights of the spikes near the zero
point in different years, we find that the spikes increase, although just slightly, as the
median values of the nominal wage changes decrease. Of the four years 1995–98, the
9
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17. The symmetrically differenced histogram in Figure 2 has a large downward spike. This is because the spike near
the zero point of the original histogram is located to the left of the median.
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[3] 1997 [4] 1998median is highest at 3.23 percent in 1996, and in that year the spike near the zero point
comprises less than 20 percent of all the samples. As the median declines, the spike
grows larger, and in 1998 the spike comprises about 23 percent of all the samples. 
This tendency whereby the percentage of samples near the zero point increases as 
the nominal wage change distribution moves toward the left could be another piece of
supporting evidence for the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity.
C. Statistics Measuring the Skewness of the Distributions
Next, we compute skewness statistics to examine whether the nominal wage distribu-
tions are statistically skewed to the right. Since Lebow et al. (1995) point out that 
the conventional skewness coefficient is sensitive to the inclusion of outliers in 
the samples, we also use four other statistics which are robust to outliers: the 
mean-median difference, the sign statistics, the sign rank statistics, and the thinness
statistics proposed by Lebow et al. (1995).
18
The definitions and the asymptotic distributions for these statistics are 
summarized in Table 1. These statistics asymptotically approach zero under the null
hypothesis that the nominal wage change distribution is symmetric. If the null
hypothesis is rejected by the test using asymptotic distribution, the nominal wage
change distribution can be judged as being statistically skewed.
When the nominal wage change distribution is skewed to the right, the skewness
coefficient has a positive value. The mean-median difference is calculated by 
subtracting the median from the mean. It takes a positive value when the distribution
is skewed to the right because in such cases the mean lies to the right of the median.
The sign statistics indicate the number of samples between the mean and the median.
This number increases as the extent of right-skewness in the nominal wage change
distribution increases. The sign rank statistics assign a rank, in ascending order, to
each sample based on its distance from the median, and subtract the sum of the ranks
below the median from the sum of the ranks above it. When the nominal wage
change distribution is skewed to the right, many of the high-ranked samples are
located above the median. Therefore, the sign rank statistics are positive if the 
nominal wage change distribution is skewed to the right.
The thinness statistics are presented in Lebow et al. (1995), and hereafter referred
to as the LSW. The LSW is calculated by subtracting the proportion of samples
below zero from the proportion above twice the median. Because twice the median
and zero are equidistant from the median, the LSW becomes zero when the nominal
wage change distribution is symmetric. The LSW is positive when there are relatively
few samples with negative nominal wage changes and the distribution is skewed to
the right. The LSW not only measures the right-skewness of the nominal wage
change distribution but also detects the asymmetry generated by downward nominal
wage rigidity in the distribution, since it calculates the samples less than zero.
Table 2 presents these statistics for the regular monthly salaries of full-time
employees, along with the probabilities (the p-value) that the null hypotheses are
rejected. The statistics are positive, and the null hypotheses are mostly rejected at a
10 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/AUGUST 2003
18. These statistics are not greatly influenced by the spikes near the zero point.11
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Table 1  Definition of Statistics Measuring the Skewness of the Nominal Wage
Change Distribution












Notes: 1. See McLaughlin (2000) for detailed explanations of all the statistics.
2. yi expresses the nominal wage change, y – the mean value of yi, and y
m the median value 
of yi,   is the standard deviation of yi, and n is the number of samples. I(c) is the index 
function of 1 (0) when the condition c holds (doesn’t hold). S(a) is a sign function with a
value of 1 (–1) when the variable a is non-negative (negative). R(a) is a rank function 
showing the ascending rank order of variable a. F(•) expresses the normal distribution when
the cumulative density function N(0, σ
2) has a mean value of zero and a variance of σ
2.
3. The null hypothesis, H0: F(yi) = 1 − F(2y
m − yi),  i, indicates that the distribution of yi
is symmetric. 
4. For the mean-median difference, the asymptotic distribution is derived by treating the
median as known. 
5. For the sign rank statistics and the LSW, the asymptotic distributions are derived by 
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Table 2  Statistics Measuring the Skewness of the Nominal Wage Change
Distributions for the Regular Monthly Salaries of Full-Time Employees
Pooled By survey year
1994–98 1995 1996 1997 1998
Skewness statistics
Skewness coefficient 1.63) 3.01) 1.28) 0.85) 1.46)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean-median difference 1.77) 1.52) 2.01) 1.58) 1.23)
(0.000) (0.073) (0.027) (0.039) (0.088)
Sign statistics 0.10) 0.07) 0.12) 0.09) 0.08)
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Sign rank statistics 0.03) 0.03) 0.03) 0.04) 0.02)
(0.024) (0.230) (0.235) (0.150) (0.282)
LSW 0.11) 0.10) 0.10) 0.13) 0.11)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fraction of nominal wage change rates (percent)
Positive 60.84 59.41 62.26 60.23 55.76
Zero 14.63 16.24 13.62 15.15 15.58
Negative 24.54 24.35 24.12 24.62 28.66
Median (percent) 2.78 2.75 3.33 2.45 1.60
Number of samples 1,292 271 257 264 321
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are p-values.
2. Data for 1994 are not presented because no male data are available for that year.
3. Sign statistics are divided by n, and sign rank statistics are divided by n
2.
1 N(0, —(F(0)[1 − F(0)] + F(2y
m)  nsignificance level of less than 5 percent.
19 Thus, it can be said that all the nominal
wage change distributions are skewed to the right for the entire period and for the
individual survey years.
IV. Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity by the Type of Nominal
Wages, Employment Status, and Sex
In this section, we examine the downward rigidity of other types of nominal wages,
such as the annual earnings of full-time workers, and hourly wages of part-time 
workers, while separating the samples by sex. The types of nominal wages we examine
include (1) the regular monthly salaries of full-time male employees; (2) the annual
earnings of full-time male employees; (3) the regular monthly salaries of full-time
female employees; (4) the annual earnings of full-time female employees; and (5) the
hourly wages of part-time female employees.
As in the previous section, we restrict the samples to individuals employed at 
the same firm for two consecutive years. The regular monthly salaries are the same 
samples we used in the previous section, although we break down the samples into
male and female employees. We break down the samples by sex because the Japanese
labor markets for males and females may have different characteristics, and because
the JPSC is conducted solely on females.
20
In Japan, the ratio of bonus payments to regular monthly salaries is higher than in
other countries, and the fluctuations in bonus payments are far larger than those of
regular monthly salaries. This suggests that the extent of the downward nominal
wage rigidity may differ between regular monthly salaries and annual earnings that
include bonus payments.
21
The annual earnings consist of regular salaries, bonuses, and overtime pay.
22 The
majority of the changes in overtime pay reflect quantitative adjustments in the number
of overtime working hours. Thus, ideally we should use annual earnings net of over-
time pay for examining downward nominal wage rigidity. However, firms that reduce
bonus payments during recessions may simultaneously reduce overtime working hours
as well. Thus, if we only use the annual earnings samples in which overtime working
hours did not change significantly from the previous year, this could cause some bias
in the annual earnings changes. Therefore, the analyses in this paper view the changes
in annual earnings as the outcome of the overall adjustment of personnel expenses,
covering regular salaries and bonus payments as well as overtime pay.
Furthermore, taking into account Japan’s “dual labor markets,” in which full-time
and part-time employees are segmented, we consider the possibility that the extent of
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19. Since the hypothesis tests are based on the asymptotic variance, they are subject to small sample bias. The results
show that the p-value of the sign rank statistics increases when the sample is divided into each survey year, which
might be because the sign rank statistics are especially vulnerable to the influence of small samples.
20. Because the survey respondents (females) answer wage-related questions both for themselves and for their 
husbands, the measurement errors in the reported nominal wages may well vary by sex.
21. For example, Suruga (1987) states that bonuses account for over 20 percent of wage fluctuations in Japan, and
that wage adjustment by bonuses is far more prevalent during recessions than during booms.
22. As for the nominal wage units, the regular monthly salaries are expressed in ¥1,000, the annual earnings in
¥10,000, and the hourly wages of part-time employees in ¥1. the downward nominal wage rigidity may differ between full-time and part-time
employees. Since most of the part-time employees in Japan are females and those
workers earn income by hourly wage, we limit the hourly wage samples to part-time
female employees. Moreover, for the hourly wages of part-time female employees,
samples below the minimum wage are excluded.
The number of samples in each nominal wage type are (1) 735 for the regular
monthly salaries of full-time males (1994–98 waves), (2) 1,384 for the annual earnings
of full-time males (1994–97 waves),
23 (3) 557 for the regular monthly salaries of 
full-time females (1993–98 waves), (4) 804 for the annual earnings of full-time 
females (1993–97 waves), and (5) 436 for the hourly wages of part-time females
(1993–98 waves).
A. Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity for Regular Monthly Salaries, 
Annual Earnings, and Hourly Wages
Figure 4 presents the histograms and the symmetrically differenced histograms from
the nominal wage change distributions for the five types of nominal wages explained
above. As in Section III, each histogram has very large numbers of samples forming
spikes near the zero points. The spike for the regular monthly salaries is bigger than
that for the annual earnings, and the spike for the hourly wages is even larger. As for
the skewness, each histogram looks skewed to the right in the sense that the left-hand
sides of the distributions are smaller than the right-hand sides, with a relatively small
number of nominal wage cuts. 
The symmetrically differenced histograms also exhibit a trend toward positive 
values, confirming that the distributions are skewed to the right. Similar to the size of
the spikes, this tendency is particularly notable for the regular monthly salaries and
hourly wages.
Table 3 presents the statistics measuring the skewness of the nominal wage change
distributions and the probabilities that the null hypotheses are rejected for each type 
of nominal wages. The statistics are all positive, and the null hypotheses are rejected 
at a significance level of less than 5 percent except for the sign rank statistics for 
the regular monthly salaries of full-time male and female employees and the annual 
earnings of full-time female employees. These findings demonstrate that the nominal
wage change distributions for both males and females and for both full-time and 
part-time employees are all statistically skewed to the right.
The extent of downward nominal wage rigidity is particularly strong for the
hourly wages of part-time female employees. For this group, nearly 60 percent of the
samples have zero nominal wage changes, and almost none of the samples experience
wage cuts. In contrast, about 25 percent of the males and females in the sample for
the regular monthly salaries and annual earnings experience wage cuts. Thus, it is
worth noting that while downward nominal wage rigidity exists for monthly salaries
13
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23. Since the survey questions ask employees about their earnings in the past year, there is a one-year time lag for these
data. For example, the responses to the 1998 survey indicate the earnings received during 1997. As a result, the
annual earnings data are effectively one year shorter compared with the regular monthly salaries and part-time
hourly wage data. The sample for the annual earnings of full-time male and female employees includes employees
temporarily transferred to other companies (shukko), and those who experienced job rotation within the same firm
(haiten). The numbers of such cases are 6 males and 2 females for shukko, and 263 males and 108 females for haiten.14 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/AUGUST 2003
Figure 4  Nominal Wage Change Distributions by Nominal Wage Type
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[1] Regular Monthly Salaries of Full-Time Male Employees
[2] Annual Earnings of Full-Time Male Employees
[3] Regular Monthly Salaries of Full-Time Female Employees
and annual earnings, its extent is not strong enough to rule out negative nominal
wage changes in some samples. 15
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Figure 4  (continued)
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[4] Annual Earnings of Full-Time Female Employees
[5] Hourly Wages of Part-Time Female Employees
Note: The bell-shaped line on each of the histograms shows the normal distribution 
calculated from the mean and standard deviation of the data. The small triangle (∆)
located on the horizontal axis slightly above the zero point indicates the median.16 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/AUGUST 2003
Table 3  Statistics Measuring the Skewness of the Nominal Wage Change
Distributions for Each Nominal Wage Type












Skewness coefficient 1.83) 1.32) 1.33) 1.33) 1.28)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean-median difference 1.91) 1.68) 1.38) 1.30) 1.70)
(0.001) (0.000) (0.018) (0.029) (0.000)
Sign statistics 0.10) 0.06) 0.10) 0.07) 0.14)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sign rank statistics 0.03) 0.03) 0.01) 0.02) 0.18)
(0.057) (0.015) (0.372) (0.183) (0.000)
LSW 0.12) 0.11) 0.07) 0.07) 0.40)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fraction of nominal wage change rates (percent)
Positive 57.14 58.96 65.71 62.94 50.46
Zero 16.19 12.07 12.57 9.95 41.97
Negative 26.67 28.97 21.72 27.11 7.57
Median (percent) 2.15 2.90 3.83 3.70 0.57
Number of samples 735 1,384 557 804 436
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are p-values.
2. Sign statistics are divided by n, and sign rank statistics are divided by n
2.
B. Skewness of the Nominal Wage Change Distributions after Controlling
Individual Characteristics 
So far, we have not considered the possibility that the observed right-skewness in the
nominal wage change distributions could be a statistical artifact from mixing several
symmetric distributions with different mean values.
24 For example, when three 
normal distributions with different mean values are mixed in one distribution as
shown in Figure 5, the mixed distribution is skewed to the right even though the
three original distributions are all symmetric. Accordingly, we should examine the
nominal wage changes net of the mean value in each group.
To consider this mixing issue, we regress the nominal wage changes on the 
individual characteristics, and compute residuals from the regression. By examining
the distribution of the residuals, which are expected to have no significant difference
in individual characteristics, we can confirm the robustness of the right-skewness in
the nominal wage change distributions after controlling individual characteristics.
As regressors, we employ the following variables from the JPSC: a constant, age,
tenure, labor market experience, years of education, 13 big cities dummy (a value of
one for those who live in Japan’s 13 biggest cities and a value of zero for those 
24. This is also noted by McLaughlin (1999, 2000).who live elsewhere), firm size dummies (indicating the number of employees at the
company where the individual is employed as less than 30, 30–99, 100–999, or
1,000 or more), industry dummies (indicating the industry at the firm where the 
individual is employed as construction, manufacturing, wholesaling or retailing,
finance, insurance, real estate, transportation or telecommunications, or services),
occupational dummies (manager, expert, engineer or faculty member, clerical worker,
sales or service worker, technician or laborer), and year dummies.
25
Table 4 presents the statistics measuring the skewness of the distributions 
calculated from the regression residuals for the five types of nominal wages.
26 Aside
from the sign rank statistics for the regular monthly salaries and annual earnings of
full-time male and female employees, the statistics are all significantly positive.
Therefore, using the definition adopted in this paper, we conclude that downward
nominal wage rigidity exists, even after controlling the individual characteristics.
17
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25. The age variable is included in the regressors to consider the annual wage accrual (teisho), which is a distinctive
characteristic of Japan’s employment practices.
26. Note that since the mean values of the residuals is zero by definition, the median becomes negative when a 
distribution is right-skewed. In this case, the LSW is not an appropriate measure because the LSW is always 
negative. One possible way to use the LSW in this case is to view the mode as the spike near the zero point, and
consider the proportion below the mode. However, it is difficult to apply this method because the mode in the
residuals is not distinct. Therefore, we simply show the four statistics aside from the LSW in Table 4.
Figure 5  Skewness Resulting from Mixing Normal Distributions with 
Different Mean Values
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N (1, 0.5)C. Relation between Nominal Wage Changes and Wage Levels
Lastly, we briefly examine the relationship between nominal wage changes and wage
levels. Suppose that the downward nominal wage rigidity forces firms to leave the
wage level unchanged even when it should be cut. If the zero spike samples are
mainly from low wage-level samples, this would indicate that the downward nominal
wage rigidity tends to narrow the wage level differentials.
27
To examine whether or not such a mechanism is at work, we divide the data sets
into six quantiles based on the wage levels (the group below the 1st quantile receives
the lowest wages, and that in the 6th quantile receives the highest).
28 We then present
the relationships between wage changes and wage levels for each stratum in Table 5. 
According to the table, the percentages of samples with nominal wage changes of
zero are basically the same among all wage strata (across all quantiles) for all five types
of nominal wages. In other words, the observed spikes near the zero points of the
nominal wage change distributions include samples from all wage strata. This result
confirms that downward nominal wage rigidity is by no means more distinct for
lower wage levels. 
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27. If nominal wages for the employees at a given firm are downwardly rigid, and if that firm finds it impossible to
retain the wage levels, then the company might fire its costly full-time employees to replace them with cheaper
part-time workers. If this is the case, the wage differential could increase at the macro level. Therefore, it is
important to note that the influences on wage differentials considered in this paper are strictly limited to those
among employees who continue working at the same firms. 
28. The wage levels are converted to a real basis using the overall CPI (adjusted for the effects of the April 1997 
consumption tax increase).
Table 4  Statistics Measuring the Skewness of the Nominal Wage Change
Distributions from the Regression Residuals












Skewness coefficient 1.77) 1.29) 1.33) 1.36) 1.19)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean-median difference 1.46) 1.48) 1.35) 1.24) 1.06)
(0.008) (0.001) (0.018) (0.033) (0.001)
Sign statistics 0.09) 0.07) 0.08) 0.05) 0.16)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Sign rank statistics 0.02) 0.02) 0.02) 0.02) 0.07)
(0.204) (0.067) (0.168) (0.153) (0.008)
Fraction of nominal wage change rates (percent)
Positive 41.36 43.14 42.01 45.27 34.17
Negative 58.64 56.86 57.99 54.73 65.83
Number of samples 735 1,384 557 804 436
Notes :1. Figures in parentheses are p-values.
2. Sign statistics is divided by n, and sign rank statistics are divided by n
2.
3. The statistics are applied to the residuals from regressions of nominal wage changes on
individual characteristics.On the other hand, Table 5 shows that a large percentage of the samples in the
low-wage stratum experience wage cuts for each type of nominal wages. There is also
a slight tendency for a large percentage of the samples in the high-wage stratum to
experience wage increases. Judging solely from the samples used in this paper, these
results indicate that wage differentials are expanding, rather than shrinking.
Therefore, the conclusions reached in Table 5 provide no evidence that downward
nominal wage rigidity contributes to narrowing wage differentials. 
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Table 5  Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity and Wage Differentials
[1] Full-Time Male Employees
Average wage
Wage change distribution Number of change rate
samples (percent)
Negative Zero Positive (standard error)
Regular monthly salaries
(Current level)
1st quantile 130 –3.74 8.57 3.40 5.71
(15.27)
2nd quantile 119 –0.37 5.31 3.27 7.62
(14.07)
3rd quantile 119 1.06 4.76 2.86 8.57
(13.71)
4th quantile 123 6.15 3.40 2.04 11.29
(15.42)
5th quantile 122 7.75 2.04 2.59 11.97
(13.42)




1st quantile 233 –5.57 9.25 1.73 5.85
(20.79)
2nd quantile 229 2.51 4.77 2.60 9.18
(15.29)
3rd quantile 236 3.59 4.99 2.02 10.04
(13.94)
4th quantile 226 4.40 4.62 2.31 9.39
(13.39)
5th quantile 231 6.34 2.89 2.10 11.71
(12.64)
6th quantile 229 8.22 2.46 1.30 12.79
(13.80)
Note: All the samples are rearranged into ascending order by wage level and divided into six groups,
so that the samples in the 1st quantile receive the lowest wages and those in the 6th quantile
receive the highest. When there are multiple samples at the dividing point between two 
quantiles, all of these samples are categorized in the lower quantiles, and thus the quantiles 
do not have the same number of samples. The wage level is converted to a real basis using 
the annual CPI (adjusted for the April 1997 consumption tax increase). 
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Table 5  (continued)
[2] Full-Time Female Employees
Average wage
Wage change distribution Number of change rate
samples (percent)
Negative Zero Positive (standard error)
Regular monthly salaries
(Current level)
1st quantile 93 –4.25 7.36 2.87 6.46
(15.61)
2nd quantile 93 3.56 4.31 2.33 10.05
(11.03)
3rd quantile 93 4.94 2.87 2.69 11.13
(14.50)
4th quantile 93 3.79 2.87 1.62 12.21
(10.57)
5th quantile 93 8.81 1.80 0.72 14.18
(12.75)




1st quantile 134 –8.16 7.84 2.11 6.72
(26.70)
2nd quantile 137 2.10 5.35 2.36 9.33
(19.69)
3rd quantile 132 3.34 4.73 2.24 9.45
(13.65)
4th quantile 133 6.05 3.48 0.87 12.19
(15.47)
5th quantile 137 7.80 3.36 1.00 12.69
(13.48)
6th quantile 131 8.15 2.36 1.37 12.56
(13.67)
Note: All the samples are rearranged into ascending order by wage level and divided into six 
groups, so that the samples in the 1st quantile receive the lowest wages and those in the 
6th quantile receive the highest. When there are multiple samples at the dividing point 
between two quantiles, all of these samples are categorized in the lower quantiles, and thus 
the quantiles do not have the same number of samples. The wage level is converted to a real
basis using the annual CPI (adjusted for the April 1997 consumption tax increase). 21
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V. Relation between the Skewness of the Nominal Wage
Change Distribution and the Inflation Rate
A. Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity and Downward Real Wage Rigidity
Does our evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity provide grounds for a mone-
tary policy targeting a small but positive rather than a zero inflation rate to “grease the
wheels” of the Japanese labor market? In our view, it is premature to say yes at this
stage, since we need to distinguish downward nominal wage rigidity from downward
real wage rigidity.
Let us first consider the case where the downward wage rigidity exists only on a
nominal basis. The relationship between the nominal wage change distribution and
the inflation rate can be illustrated as shown in Figure 6 [1]. As shown on the 
left-hand side of this diagram, when the inflation rate is low, the distribution is
skewed to the right since the nominal wage changes hit the zero floor. In this case,
from a firm’s perspective, the wage costs (real wages) are fixed at higher levels than
what they would be if the distribution were not skewed. As shown on the right-hand
side of this diagram, however, when the inflation rate is high, the distribution is not
skewed to the right since the left tail of the distribution is above zero. In this case, a
firm finds it easier to implement real wage cuts by setting nominal wage increase rates
Table 5  (continued)
[3] Part-Time Female Employees
Average wage
Wage change distribution Number of change rate
samples (percent)
Negative Zero Positive (standard error)
Hourly wage
(Current level)
1st quantile 76 0.82 1.83 8.03 7.57
(4.02)
2nd quantile 79 1.03 1.15 9.40 7.57
(7.49)
3rd quantile 66 2.22 0.92 5.28 8.94
(3.55)
4th quantile 70 1.46 0.92 7.57 7.57
(6.17)
5th quantile 74 2.60 1.38 6.19 9.40
(6.96)
6th quantile 71 4.16 1.38 5.50 9.40
(9.67)
Note: All the samples are rearranged into ascending order by wage level and divided into six groups,
so that the samples in the 1st quantile receive the lowest wages and those in the 6th quantile
receive the highest. When there are multiple samples at the dividing point between two 
quantiles, all of these samples are categorized in the lower quantiles, and thus the quantiles 
do not have the same number of samples. The wage level is converted to a real basis using 
the annual CPI (adjusted for the April 1997 consumption tax increase). lower than the inflation rate. Thus, if downward wage rigidity exists on a nominal
basis only, or if the right-skewness of the distribution is a unique phenomenon under
low inflation, a monetary policy targeting a small but positive inflation rate could
prevent the nominal wage change distribution from being skewed to the right, and
thus help firms to implement real wage adjustments. This kind of argument is seen
in Akerlof et al. (1996).
29
On the other hand, it is also possible to view the downward wage rigidity as 
associated with the rational choices of real wages made by firms, as assumed by 
efficiency wage theories. When downward wage rigidity exists on a real basis, as
shown in Figure 6 [2], the downward nominal wage distribution will always be
skewed to the right, regardless of whether the inflation rate is high or low. In this
case, a monetary policy targeting a small but positive rather than a zero inflation rate
cannot provide any additional latitude for firms to implement real wage adjustments.
That is to say, when there is downward real wage rigidity, the observed downward
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29. They state that the skewness of the nominal wage change distribution simply reflects the fact that people do not
like to accept negative wage changes in nominal terms, and that therefore monetary policy should aim at positive
inflation to avoid nominal wage cuts. This idea often appears in discussions of money illusion.
Figure 6  Relationship between Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity and 
the Inflation Rate
Nominal wage change distribution
(low inflationary period)
 [1] When Nominal Wages Are Downwardly Rigid 
Inflation rate, nominal wage change rate
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[2] When Real Wages Are Downwardly Rigid 
Inflation rate, nominal wage change rate
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Nominal wage change distribution
(low inflationary period)
Nominal wage change 
distribution
(high inflationary period)nominal wage rigidity does not provide a basis for targeting a small but positive 
inflation rate. This kind of argument is seen in McLaughlin (1994, 1999, 2000).
The implications for monetary policy are completely different when the downward
wage rigidity is only nominal, and when it is both nominal and real. The findings
obtained in this paper thus far correspond to the left-hand sides of Figure 6 [1] and [2].
To determine the implications for monetary policy, we need to know what happens to
the nominal wage change distributions when the inflation rate rises as indicated by 
the right-hand sides of these diagrams. Will the right-skewness of the nominal wage
change distributions disappear when inflation rises as shown in the upper diagram, or
remain as shown in the lower one? 
To answer this question, we need to analyze data from a period of high inflation.
In the previous literature, Card and Hyslop (1997), for example, conclude that the
nominal wage change distribution becomes increasingly skewed to the right as the
inflation rate declines, and that there is no skewness during periods of high inflation,
as illustrated in Figure 6 [1]. In contrast, McLaughlin (1994, 1999, 2000) shows that
there is no statistically significant correlation between right-skewness and the 
inflation rate. Then, he concludes that the skewness of the nominal wage change 
distribution exists regardless of the inflation rate level, as illustrated in Figure 6 [2].
30
He argues that this happens because firms make rational decisions not to reduce 
real wages, as posited by efficiency wage theories, or that the real wage change 
distribution itself may be right-skewed due to skill-biased technological progress.
31
Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine whether the right-skewness in the 
nominal wage change distributions identified in this paper indicates downward 
rigidity only in nominal wages. This is because the data used in this paper are limited
to a period with an extremely low inflation rate.
32 In fact, when we compute real
wage change distributions by converting the nominal wages into a real basis,
33 it turns
out that the shapes of the real wage change distributions are nearly identical to those
of the nominal wage change distributions. Therefore, the observed right-skewness in
the nominal wage change distributions might reflect downward real wage rigidity. 
Nonetheless, it is still possible to provide one piece of evidence regarding the 
relationship between downward nominal wage rigidity and monetary policy by 
focusing on the differences in inflation rates not only by time period, but also by
region. Therefore, we now investigate the correlation between the statistics measuring
nominal wage change distribution and regional inflation rates.
23
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30. Lebow et al. (1995) reach a conclusion similar to McLaughlin’s. Using Canadian data, Crawford and Wright
(2001) also show that the skewness of the nominal wage change distribution cannot be associated with the 
inflation rate because the variance of the nominal wage changes may differ depending on the inflation rate. 
31. Fares and Hogan (2000) make a similar argument. McLaughlin (1999) also points out the possibility of sample
selection bias whereby negative nominal wage changes may be difficult to observe.
32. To the best of our knowledge, there are no longitudinal data readily available to researchers covering a period of
high inflation in Japan.
33. Real wages are computed by using the overall CPI for each year (adjusted for the April 1997 consumption 
tax increase).B. Correlation between the Skewness of the Nominal Wage Change Distribution
and the Inflation Rate
The upper half of Table 6 presents the correlation coefficients for statistics measuring
the skewness of the nominal wage change distributions and the annual inflation rate
calculated by survey year and region
34 (adjusted for the April 1997 consumption tax
increase). The inflation rate during this period varies from –0.60 to 1.53 percent.
35
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Table 6  Correlations between the Skewness Statistics and the Inflation Rate 










Correlation with inflation rate
Skewness coefficient –0.048 0.185 –0.274 0.083
(0.784) (0.356) (0.096) (0.630)
Mean-median difference 0.225 0.060 –0.175 0.167
(0.194) (0.768) (0.294) (0.332)
Sign statistics –0.123 –0.037 –0.304 0.099
(0.483) (0.853) (0.064) (0.567)
Sign rank statistics 0.025 0.128 –0.147 0.131
(0.889) (0.523) (0.378) (0.445)
LSW –0.023 0.053 –0.193 0.191
(0.898) (0.794) (0.246) (0.263)
Correlation with lagged inflation rate
Skewness coefficient –0.303 –0.046 0.217 0.132
(0.077) (0.818) (0.190) (0.444)
Mean-median difference –0.523 –0.137 0.008 –0.175
(0.001) (0.496) (0.962) (0.309)
Sign statistics –0.443 –0.110 –0.038 –0.159
(0.008) (0.586) (0.821) (0.354)
Sign rank statistics –0.379 –0.202 –0.065 –0.052
(0.025) (0.312) (0.698) (0.765)
LSW –0.062 –0.139 –0.115 –0.108
(0.722) (0.489) (0.491) (0.531)
Number of samples 35 27 38 45
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are p-values.
2. The inflation rates are the year-to-year changes in the overall CPI by regional bloc, 
adjusted for the April 1997 consumption tax increase.
3. Some regions are excluded from our analysis because of the shortage of samples. 
34. This is based on the JPSC respondents’ residential information by prefecture. However, since the number of 
samples for some prefectures is extremely small, we use regional blocs. These regional blocs follow the categoriza-
tion used in the CPI, which divides Japan into 10 regions: Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Hokuriku, Tokai, Kinki,
Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu, and Okinawa. Okinawa is excluded from our analysis because we have few samples
in this bloc. Therefore, we compute the correlation coefficients for the remaining nine regions over a period of
five years. It should be noted that this analysis is based on the residence locations of the respondents, which may
not exactly match the data on the locations of their workplaces.
35. These figures are the lowest and highest inflation rates recorded in the regional blocs in our data. As explained in
Section II, there are no male data for 1993. We also lack 1998 data for the annual earnings of both male and
female full-time employees. Thus, the lowest and highest inflation rates slightly vary by the nominal wages 
analyzed herein.The statistics are those explained in Section IV for the following nominal wages: 
(1) the regular monthly salaries of full-time male employees; (2) the annual earnings
of full-time male employees; (3) the regular monthly salaries of full-time female
employees; and (4) the annual earnings of full-time female employees.
36
If the nominal wage change distributions are only skewed to the right during 
periods of low inflation, then the correlation coefficient should have a statistically 
significant negative value. If the right-skewness of the distributions remains regardless
of the inflation rate, then the correlation coefficient should not be significantly 
different from zero. 
Looking at the upper half of Table 6, we find no statistically significant correla-
tion in any cases. While the negative correlations for the regular monthly salaries of
full-time female employees are somewhat high, they are not statistically significant.
For the other cases, the correlations are mostly positive. 
Yet it is important to note that under Japan’s annual spring wage offensive
(shunto), collective bargaining on the nominal wage increase is frequently based on
the prior year’s inflation rate. Considering this, the lower half of Table 6 presents the 
correlation coefficients computed using one-year lagged inflation rates. The results
are substantially different. For example, the correlation coefficients for the regular
monthly salaries of full-time male employees are around –0.4, and these negative 
figures are statistically significant for three out of the five statistics. 
To visually confirm this point, Figure 7 plots the skewness coefficients and 
mean-median differences for the regular monthly salaries of full-time male employees
against the lagged inflation rate. Looking at this scatter diagram, while there are some
negative figures for the skewness coefficients and mean-median differences, it does
appear that there are negative correlations between the skewness statistics and 
the lagged inflation rates. Regardless, no clear correlation is found for the annual
earnings of full-time male employees, or for the monthly salaries or annual earnings
of female employees.
To summarize, while the analyses in this section indicate no strong correlation
between the right-skewness of the nominal wage change distributions and the 
inflation rate, they do show a negative correlation for the regular monthly salaries of
full-time male employees. This may suggest that the downward wage rigidity in the
regular monthly salaries of full-time male employees only exists on a nominal basis. 
Nevertheless, we must remember that although there were some variations in the
inflation rates in the different regional blocs, they only range between –0.60 and 1.53
percent. Therefore, it is important to note that the tentative conclusions derived here
cannot be used to determine, a priori, how the right-skewness of the nominal wage
change distribution might change under a high inflation rate. 
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36. The hourly wages of part-time female employees are excluded from the analyses in Table 6 because few 
observations are available.26 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/AUGUST 2003











[1] Skewness Coefficient and Lagged Inflation Rate
[2] Mean-Median Difference and Lagged Inflation Rate
Note: The inflation rates are the year-to-year changes in the
lagged overall CPI by regional bloc, adjusted for the 
April 1997 consumption tax increase.VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, as the first attempt to verify downward nominal wage rigidity in Japan
based on longitudinal data, we examine the shape of the nominal wage change 
distribution from various perspectives using the 1993–98 data provided by the JPSC.
Observing the nominal wage change distributions by several types of nominal
wages, we obtain the following findings. First, the right-skewness is particularly 
pronounced for the hourly wages of part-time female employees. There are a large
number of samples located in the spike near the zero point, and few samples show
negative wage changes. If there were absolutely no nominal wage rigidity, then the
distributions should be symmetric on both sides of the medians. Thus, the observed
right-skewness can be interpreted as suggesting the existence of strong downward
rigidity for the hourly wages of part-time female employees. Second, for the nominal
wage change distributions of the regular monthly salaries and annual earnings of 
full-time male and female employees, we also find a substantial number of samples 
in the spikes near the zero points, suggesting downward nominal wage rigidity.
Nevertheless, we also find a sizable number of these samples experiencing wage cuts.
The formal tests based on statistical methods confirm the right-skewness of the
nominal wage distributions. The statistics measuring the right-skewness include the
skewness coefficient, the mean-median difference, the sign statistics, the sign rank
statistics, and the LSW. Our findings indicate that all of the nominal wage change
distributions are statistically skewed to the right. Based on these findings, we 
conclude that Japanese nominal wages are downwardly rigid, as judged by the shape
of the observed nominal wage change distributions. 
As for monetary policy implications from these findings, it is necessary to confirm
that the nominal wage change distribution is right-skewed during low inflationary
periods and not right-skewed during high inflationary periods. If that is the case,
then monetary policy targeting a small but positive rather than zero inflation rate can
be justified to “grease the wheels” of the labor market by assisting the downward 
flexibility of real wages. The correlations between the right-skewness and the regional
inflation rates are examined to see if the right-skewness disappears under high 
inflation. Although the highest regional inflation rate in the data is merely about 
1 percent, we find that, for the regular monthly salaries of full-time male employees
only, the right-skewness of the nominal wage change distribution does tend to 
disappear as the inflation rate rises. It should be noted, however, that further investi-
gations of this issue using data from higher inflation rate periods are necessary before
we can obtain a general conclusion that monetary policy should target a small but
positive inflation rate because of the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity.
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37. In discussing the optimal inflation rate that monetary policy should target, broader issues aside from downward
nominal wage rigidity must also be addressed. For example, the social costs of deflation include the influence on
the financial system from debt deflation, and the reduced effectiveness of monetary policy under the zero bound
constraints on nominal interest rates. Conversely, the social costs of high inflation include the existence of 
so-called “shoe leather costs,” the diminished signaling function of prices, and misallocation of resources resulting
from difficulties in distinguishing between relative and overall price level movements, as well as problems related
to the non-neutrality of tax systems with regard to inflation. For details, see Shiratsuka (2001). In closing, we would like to make a few comments regarding the potential future
research on downward nominal wage rigidity. One natural extension is to identify the
extent of the downward nominal wage rigidity via model estimations. This enables us
to control individual characteristics and measurement errors in reported nominal
wages, and to provide a precise and comparable estimate of the extent of downward
nominal wage rigidity. Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a) follow this approach by using
the same data adopted in this paper. 
Another direction for future research is to quantify the effects of downward 
nominal wage rigidity on other macroeconomic variables, especially those that are
closely followed by policymakers. For instance, if the influence on unemployment 
is deemed negligible, then this by no means provides a sufficient basis to justify a
monetary policy targeting a small but positive inflation rate. Investigating this issue
could require research based on both partial equilibrium models and on a general
equilibrium model, since downward nominal wage rigidity may not only increase
unemployment but also affect such factors as consumption and income.
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38. Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) examine whether downward nominal wage rigidity affects employees’ quit 
decisions by survival analysis. In addition, Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003c) simulate a New-Keynesian 
macro model that incorporates the downward rigidity, and see how the downward rigidity affects the male 
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